



# CSS Study Suggestions and Impacts

## Appendix F

# Suggestion 19, 24, 26: Migrate to the FSSG or reallocate selected engineer and MT (dump trucks) assets from CEB

## Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Focus on core functions of the CEB (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Reduce duplicative/ redundant & excess assets (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Reduce logistical footprint (FSPG)
- Enhances mobility of the CEB (FSPG)
- Eliminate redundancy btwn CEB, FSSG & NCF (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)
- Enhance OMFTS capability (FSPG)
- Optimizes the ability to task organize at the MEF level (FSPG)

### Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, Questionnaires)
- Increase external coordination requirements - someone else decides the priority (FSPG, and Int..)
- Dump trucks are essential to core mission (Int G-4 MarDiv)
- If CSS is essential to core mission of mobility, counter mobility and survivability- the dump trucks should stay (Int G-4 MAW)
- These assets are CS not CSS- this would reduce the mobility and counter mobility of the MarDiv (Int<sub>2</sub> and Questionnaires MarDiv, FSSG)

# Suggestion 21: Consolidate Engineer Support Co with H&S Co to form a new Headquarters & Support Co, CEB

## Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Centralize all mobility assets (FSPG)
- Move non-core capabilities to appropriate units (FSPG)
- Focus on primary mission (FSPG)
- Provides battlefield mobility (FSPG)
- Reduce logistical footprint (FSPG)
- Eliminate redundancy btwn CEB, FSSG & NCF (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)
- “CEB probably has too much MEP, water and hygiene equipment” (Int CO CEB)
- The USMC possesses excess general engineering equipment (Research)

### Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, Questionnaires)
- Increase external coordination requirements (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Depends on successful centralization of mobility assets & MT assets (FSPG)
- Reduces internal flexibility of MAGTF components (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)
- Do not conduct a unilateral action - must coordinate closely with the Engineer OAG (Research)

# Suggestion 22: Migrate Mobile Electric Power support for Div HQ from CEB to HQ Bn, MARDIV

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Moves non-core capabilities to appropriate organization and units (FSPG)
- Focuses on primary mission (FSPG)
- T/E changes provide for battlefield mobility (FSPG)
- “CEB probably has too much MEP, water and hygiene equipment” (Int CO CEB)

## Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, Questionnaires)
- Separating a weapons system from its power source is like separating a core competency from a unit (Int CO Arty Regt)
- Increased coordination requirements (FSPG)

## Suggestion 23: Migrate 6 AVLB & supporting structure from Tank Bn to new Headquarters and Spt Co., Combat Engineer Bn when the CVB is fielded Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- AVLB & CBV used to create Mech Breaching Plt; increase breaching capability (FSPG)
- Enhance OMFTS capability of unit (FSPG)
- Provide better battlespace mobility for maneuver elements (FSPG)
- Focus on core capabilities (FSPG)
- The CEB provides mobility to the MarDiv as part of its core tasks (Int and Questionnaires)

### Impacts Con

- Success hinges upon the centralization of mobility assets in the CEB (e.g. Grizzly, AVLB and MT assets) (FSPG)
- The USMC participation in the Grizzly program (CVB) has been terminated though the USMC has a similar need defined in the ABV program (Research, and Int)
- The AVLB is mounted on the M1A1 tank- will tank mechanics be re-assigned to the CEB? (IPR2 Response- MARFORRES)

# Suggestion 33: Migrate Fabric Repair from FSSG to the CIF contract managed by MATCOM Source(s): IPR 2 and Questionnaire

## Impacts Pro

- Give this task to MATCOM to be executed by a current contract (Questionnaires and IPR 2)
- MATCOM has the capability to be more responsive than a number of bases in the S.E. (IPR2 Review Response- I MEF)

## Impacts Con

- The CIF contract does not currently encompass fabric repair other than 782 gear (MATCOM SAC Member)
- The CIF contract is executed by civilian contractors
- If the CIF contract becomes unfunded the capability disappears

# Suggestion 34: Migrate Fabric Repair from FSSG to Marine Corps Bases Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Focus on core competency & should migrate from FSSG (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Function can be better performed by Base (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)

## Impacts Con

- Deployed Fabric Repair saves a lot of money and transportation costs (can repair many items w/out having to order new) (Int CG MAW, G-4 FSSG)
- Most Marines do not know how to use this capability while deployed (Int.. G-4 FSSG)
- At a minimum the Air Delivery Plt and Recon Bn must retain fabric repair capability for parachute repairs (Questionnaire)
- Base Operating Support (BOS) contract awards may impact the ability, flexibility and responsiveness of base commanders to support such initiatives (Int CG Marine Corps Base, CG COMCAB)

Suggestion 72: Migrate Fabric Repair from FSSG to the S.E. for garrison ops., but maintain a military capability to deploy with Maint. Bn during expeditionary operations. Wartime requirements could be indicated by “X” billets on the Maint. Bn T/O Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

Impacts Pro

- Efficient use of fabric repair in garrison
- Fulfills a needed requirement during expeditionary operations
- Saves the Marine Corps money and time in both garrison and war
- Wartime requirements could be provided by the Reserves

Impacts Con



# Suggestion 30: Migrate selected Division and Wing Field Food Services to the FSSG (RDK Only)

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Focus MAGTF elements on core competencies (FSPG)
- Significant structure savings (FSPG)
- Tailored food service support to the MAGTF (FSPG)
- Reduces duplicative functions (FSPG)
- Support OMFTS (FSPG)
- Consolidation at the CSSE could provide better deployment rotation, training, equipment maintenance and support to the MAGTF (Int Food Svcs O Marine Corps Base)

## Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, and Questionnaires)
- The FSPG 99 recommendation on this function has been rejected and a new plan is being implemented (Int Food Svcs O Marine Corps Base)
- Increase external coordination requirements (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Reduces internal flexibility of MAGTF components (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)

# Suggestion 30: Migrate selected Division and Wing Field Food Services to the FSSG Continued

## Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Con cont.

- Regional contracting and 1,000 man food service reduction is on-going but is poorly planned and not coordinated with the war fighters of the MAGTF elements (Int and Questionnaires)
- The RDK has not been fielded yet, but the food service consolidation plan is underway (Int , Research and Questionnaires)
- What about requirements for short fuzzed exercise needs, shipboard feeding, units deployed for long term training and exercises (Int and Questionnaires)

### Impacts Con cont.

- Feeding is a Command Services task not CSS (Int, Questionnaires, Research)
- Big field messes are a large target- a Force Protection issue- (Int Food Svcs Officer MEF)
- Keep Tray Ration Heating Systems at the MSC level (Int G-4 FSSG)
- There is a food services plan, but we do not understand the details and no one knows what the impact will be (Int Food Svcs O, and G-3 MarDiv)

# Suggestion 31: Migrate selected Division and Wing Field Food Services to the FSSG (RDK and TRHS)

Source(s): Interview and Questionnaire

## Impacts Pro

- Same Pros described in Suggestion 17

## Impacts Con

- Only the FSSG possesses the RDK and TRHS
- The ACE and GCE only possess (internally) MREs as the sole source of feeding

# Suggestion 32: Migrate selected Division and Wing Field Food Services to the FSSG or MSCs (RDK and TRHS) Source(s): Interview and Questionnaire

## Impacts Pro

- Removes RDK and TRHS burdens from regimental, battalion and MAG and squadron levels
- Provides more flexibility in that there is a choice between the FSSG or MSCs depending on the best analysis

## Impacts Con

- See previous Cons on FS

# Suggestion 20: Migrate 2 MC1150 tractors from HQ Battery, Arty Regiment to Combat Engineer Bn

## Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Moves non-core capability to appropriate organization and units (FSPG)
- Focuses on primary mission (FSPG)
- Enhances mobility/OMFTS capability (FSPG)
- Eliminate redundancy btwn CEB, FSSG & NCF (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)
- Increases mobility of Arty Regt Hq (Int CG MarDiv)

### Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, Questionnaires)

## Suggestion 25: Reallocate general engineer & utility equipment (72 PEI) from HQ Btry, Arty Regiment

### Source(s): FSPG99

#### Impacts Pro

- Moves non-core capability to appropriate organization and units (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Eliminate excess assets and duplicate capabilities (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)
- Focuses on primary mission (FSPG)
- “We have more utilities specialists than we have tankers and AAV crewman combined” (Research)

#### Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets Note: This Con applies to all Hq Btry Suggestions that follow- (Int, Questionnaires)
- Increase external coordination requirements (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Earth moving capability used to dig gun emplacements needs to be supervised by artillery, not CSS officers and must be immediately available (Int CO Arty Regt)
- Utilities that support key weapons systems must remain organic (Int CO Arty Regt)

## Suggestion 25: Reallocate general engineer & utility equipment (72 PEI) from HQ Btry, Arty Regiment continued Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Moves non-core capability to appropriate organization and units (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Eliminate excess assets and duplicate capabilities (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)
- Focuses on primary mission (FSPG)
- “We have more utilities specialists than we have tankers and AAV crewman combined” (Research)

### Impacts Con

- The “Fix Artillery” Plan with addl Bns and HIMARS may require retention of these assets Note- applies to all following Hq Btry Cons- (Int and Research)
- These are CS not CSS assets - almost 50% of the MarDiv’s earth moving capability resides in the arty regt (Int and Questionnaires HQMC, MarDiv, FSSG)
- Reduces ability to rapidly construct and reconstitute gun emplacements and defensive positions (Int HQMC, MarDiv, FSSG, MAW)
- May be unintended consequences- take a look after ILC implementation (Int FSSG)

# Suggestion 44: Migrate 24 MT end items from HQ Battery, Arty Regiment to the FSSG

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Moves non-core capabilities to appropriate organization and units (FSPG)
- Focuses on primary mission (FSPG)
- CSSE has increased capability to provide transportation MAGTF-wide (Int and Questionnaires)
- Fielding of lighter, smaller systems (counter battery radar etc.) can be transported in HMMWVs (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires)

## Impacts Con

- Will overburden C2, ops planning, and facilities requirements for an already “flat” FSSG (Int and Questionnaires FSSG)
- Increase external coordination requirements (FSPG)
- These assets provide tactical logistics support where the FSSG leaves off-internal re-supply (unit distribution), augmentation to firing batteries (Int and Questionnaires MarDiv, CO Arty Regt, MEF)



# Suggestion 47: Migrate 20 MT end items from HQ Battery, Arty Regiment to the Combat Engineer Bn

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Moves non-core capabilities to appropriate organization and units (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)
- Alleviate mobility deficiency in CEB (FSPG, Research)
- Focuses on primary mission (FSPG)
- Fielding of lighter, smaller systems (counter battery radar etc.) can be transported in HMMWVs (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires)

## Impacts Con

- These assets provide and enhance the tactical mobility of the Hq Btry and other arty regt elements (Int and Questionnaires HQMC, MarDiv, MAW)
- Increase external coordination requirements for the HQ Btry (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Lack of responsiveness to needs of Hq Brty unit commander (Int, and Questionnaires)

# Suggestion 48: Reallocate 82 MT end items from HQ Battery, Arty Regiment

## Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Moves non-core capabilities to appropriate organization and units (FSPG)
- Focuses on primary mission (FSPG)
- Fielding of lighter, smaller systems (counter battery radar etc.) can be transported in HMMWVs (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires)
- Eliminates excess capacity (FSPG)
- Reduces logistical footprint (FSPG)
- Allows for structure/equip savings (FSPG)
- Enhance OMFTS capability of unit (FSPG)

### Impacts Con

- Increase external coordination requirements (FSPG)
- Reduces internal flexibility of MAGTF components (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Don't separate trucks from guns- the trucks are part of the weapon system (Questionnaires)

# Suggestion 1: Create a logistics support unit within the GCE along the present MWSS model

Source(s): Interviews

## Impacts Pro

- None Provided

## Impacts Con

- None Provided

# Suggestion 68: Organize the FSSG in peace as it fights in war (DSGs, CSSDs, MEB Spt. Groups, and MSSGs)

Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

## Impacts Pro

- Enhances trust between supported and supporting units
- Increases response time to supported units
- Reduces inefficient start up time associated with establishing new task organizations for each contingency
- Worked in Desert Shield/Storm
- Effectives for situations smaller than MTWs

## Impacts Con

- May be inefficient in garrison
- May eliminate a needed pool of resources in general support of the MEF

## Suggestion 8: FSSG provides an ACE Direct Support Group with permanent CSSDs positioned with each MWSS Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Provide close coordination and planning representatives to the MAG commander (FSPG, Int FSSG)
- Establish a day to day relationship (FSPG, Int FSSG)
- Provides tailored support to the ACE on continual basis (FSPG)
- Maintains flexibility and ability to expand-contract and task organize CSS (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- More efficient use of MAGTF assets and capabilities (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires)

### Impacts Con

- Increase command & staff coordination & HQs ( FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- CSS C2 exceeds FSSG capabilities (Int COs FSSG, Int and Questionnaires)
- CSSDs equal MWSS- why change? (Int MGEN, Staff Officers with GCE and ACE)
- “CSSE manning levels are lowest of all MAGTF elements” (Int CG FSSG)
- USAF is adopting the MWSS concept –why change? (Int and Questionnaires)
- Establishment of priorities- set by 21 ACE or CSSE commander ? (Int)

# Suggestion 9: FSSG provides the GCE a Direct Support Group with permanent CSSDs assigned as required

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Provide close coordination and planning representatives to the Div commander (FSPG)
- Establish a day to day relationship (FSPG)
- Provides tailored support to the GCE on continual basis (i.e. task organized CSSDs (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires))
- Maintains flexibility and ability to expand-contract and task organize CSS (FSPG, Int, & Questionnaires)
- More efficient use of MAGTF assets and capabilities (FSPG, Int, and Questionnaires)

## Impacts Con

- Increase command & staff coordination & HQs ( FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- CSS C2 exceeds FSSG capabilities (Int COs FSSG commands)
- “CSSE manning levels are lowest of all MAGTF elements” (Int CG FSSG)
- “USMC combat operations are being decentralized and CSS is being centralized” (Int BGEN MarDiv)
- Establishment of priorities- set by GCE or CSSE commander (Int)
- CSSE Marines don’t have the tactical skills needed day-to-day in the GCE (Int MarDiv COs and staff)

# Suggestion 10: Realign FSSG subordinate elements on the MWSS model Source(s): I&L HQMC

## Impacts Pro

- Establishes task organizations whose core competency is for direct support
- Provides more efficient and effective CSS to the MAGTF
- Reduces inefficiencies experienced by organizing new CSSDs for each operation
- Reduces response time for supported units small MAGTFs
- Reduces officers and senior enlisted structure in the FSSG
- Matches CSS officer structure to the low numbers allowed by the Marine Corps
- Increases FSSG focus on contingency operations
- A MOE would be the comparison of FSSG/MWSS officer and senior enlisted HQ structure

## Impacts Con

- Runs contrary to the current trend of centralizing assets by function
- Possible loss of equipment efficiencies due to the focus on reducing CWT
- May decrease FSSG focus on MTW operations

Suggestion 11: Create standing task-organized CSSDs to support MAGTF operations based on expected operational tempo and likely contingency operations. Periodically review, revalidate, and restructure. Source(s): I&L HQMC

Impacts Pro

- Produces flexible, changeable, and scalable CSS task organizations
- Periodic review reduces the possibility of equipment/personnel bloat
- Increases trust due to permanent relation between the supported and supporting units
- Reduces inefficiencies experienced by organizing new CSSDs for each operation
- Enhances response time in support of contingency operations

Impacts Con

- May be inefficient in garrison



# Suggestion 63: Overarching CSS Migration- Realign active and reserve component selected engineer, motor transport, food service, and MP functions, equipment and personnel to the CSSE Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Aligns core competencies with appropriate organizations (Int, and Questionnaires)
- Improves expeditionary CSS (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Provides GS capability to weight the main effort (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires )
- Maintains flexibility and ability to expand-contract and task organize CSS (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Provides tailored support to GCE/ACE on continual basis (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)

## Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Interviews, Questionnaires)
- Reduces internal flexibility of MAGTF elements (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Increases number of CSS headquarters (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Increase C2 and information communications burden (Int FSSG)
- ACE and GCE possess AGS, logistics and CS not CSS assets (Questionnaires, Int and Research)

# Suggestion 63: Overarching CSS Migration- Realign active and reserve component selected engineer, motor transport, food service, and MP functions, equipment and personnel to the CSSE cont.. Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Realigns core competencies within CSS (Int. and Questionnaires HQMC, FSSG, MEF)
- Structure saved for allocation elsewhere (Int MCB, FSSG)
- Eliminates outmoded, under used resources (Int and Questionnaires FSSG, HQMC)
- Implements “Trust Logistics” accepted for other war fighting functions (Int and Questionnaires FSSG)

## Impacts Con

- Force protection is jeopardized and rear area security resources reduced (Int and Questionnaires HQMC, MarDiv, FSSG, MAW, COMCAB, MCB)
- Mission increased with no additional resources for the CSSE (Int and Questionnaires FSSG)
- Span of control is too great (Int and Questionnaires FSSG)
- Increases competition for scarce resources (Int and Questionnaires HQMC, MarDiv, MAW and COMCAB)

Suggestion 63: Overarching CSS Migration- Realign  
active and reserve component selected engineer, motor  
transport, food service, and MP functions, equipment and  
personnel to the CSSE cont. Source(s): FSPG99

Impacts Pro

Impacts Con

- MAGTF operational effectiveness is decreased in the field (Int and Questionnaires HQMC, MarDiv, MAW, COMCAB)
- The MAGTF balance may be destroyed (Int CO FSSG)
- Ability to move and transport troops, supplies and equipment to the point of application is reduced (Int and Questionnaires HQMC, MarDiv, MAG, MAW, COMCAB, FSSG)

# Suggestion 36: Migrate MPs from CE, ACE and GCE to establish MP Bn, 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> FSSG; MP Co, 3d FSSG

## Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Will enhance training, unit readiness, career development, mentoring, equipment accountability and readiness and MP availability for contingency deployments (Int and Questionnaires)
- The MP Bn commander is the single voice and principle advisor to the MEF/MAGTF and Base, Post or Station commander on all MP issues (Int, Questionnaires and Research)
- Provides solution to CMC noted MP deficiencies (FSPG)
- Enhances & increases support to MSCs and MAGTFs (FSPG)
- Establishes MP Plt (1/40) as basic module for support (FSPG, and Int)

### Impacts Con

- Commands will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held MP assets (Int, and Questionnaires)
- Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for airfields and other locations does not work (Int MGEN and others)
- 3 officers and 33 enlisted (non 58XX) Marines for each MP Bn is too high a bill (Int.. and Questionnaires)
- MP provided Force Protection is a core competency of each command, do not take away from the commander (Int BGEN MarDiv)
- The MP Bn will not be a tactical unit like a USA MP Bn, (it lacks equipment) how will it be deployed (Int G-5 MEF)
- Will be too confusing btwn chains of command with the Supporting Estb., 28 FSSG, etc. (G-4 FSSG)

Suggestion 37: Migrate MP billets from the Div and Wing to form separate MP COs in HQ Bn., FSSG w/out forming a MP Bn HQ Source(s): Interview- MARFORLANT

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Con

- None Provided

## Suggestion 38: Centralize MPs under the MEF HQ rather than the CSSE Source(s): Interviews

### Impacts Pro

- MPs are a MEF asset and should be part of the MEF Headquarters Group (MHG) (Interview II MEF)
- MPs are not CSS assets, but a CS asset and function

### Impacts Con

- The MHG is already very large and the addition of a MP Bn might be too much for adequate C2
- The MEF as a MAGTF does not usually deploy

## Suggestion 75: Form a Force Protection Battalion vice a MP Battalion Source(s): IPR2 Response- III MEF

### Impacts Pro

- A Force Protection Bn would incorporate the missions of the MP and provide additional support to cover force protection
- A working group sponsored by WDID MCCDC in 1997 recommend this Force Protection Bn
- This battalion would provide the MEF commander with a training cadre of experts in areas of non-lethal weapons, and non escalatory tactics

### Impacts Con

- None Provided

# Suggestion 53: Transfer Maintenance Materiel Unit, Shop Stores from Supply Bn to Maintenance Bn

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Brings all processes for intermediate maintenance under single commander (FSPG and Int CO Material Readiness Bn)

## Impacts Con

- Training required to effect efficient operations in Maintenance Bn (FSPG)
- The Material Readiness Bn establishment has shown no tangible increase in quality of support to date (Int C/S FSSG)
- Maintenance and Supply in the FSSG are perceived as supporting themselves first then MSC units (Int G-4 MEF)



# Suggestion 54: Merge Supply and Maintenance Bns into Material Readiness Battalion by 2010

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Maintenance functions will be focused on PEIs both in garrison and as far forward in the battle space as possible (FSPG, and Int)
- One commander will be responsible for the total material readiness of the MEF (Int Dep G-3 FSSG)

## Impacts Con

- The span of control will be too great for one commander and staff (Int CO Supply Bn and Questionnaires)
- The MEF Material Readiness Bn has shown no significant tangible increase in equipment readiness to date (Int C/S FSSG)
- Complex SMU functions spread too thin among maintenance companies (Int G-4 MarDiv)
- Needs to occur in all MEFs and the MarForRes (Int)
- The Supply Consolidation Study did not recommend such action (IPR2 Response- I MEF)

# Suggestion 41: Decrease Motor Vehicle Operator structure (MOS 3531) by 125 enlisted Marines based on the introduction of MTVR

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Effectively allocates operator structure to MTVR fielding (FSPG)
- Provides structure spaces for reallocation (FSPG)
- Decreases motor vehicle operator training requirements (FSPG)

## Impacts Con

- The FSPG99 study team did not possess the correct fielding plan for the MTVR- 125 Marines MOS 3531 should not be available for reduction (Research)
- “Driving trucks is the most dangerous thing we do” (Int G-4 FSSG)
- “We should have more drivers” (Int G-4 FSSG)
- MTVRs should not be operated by non 3531s or 3533s - no incidental drivers (Int Marine Corps schools, MarDiv, MEF)
- Quantity of units and sites more critical than capacity of truck (Int..)

# Suggestion 41, 43 : Decrease Motor Vehicle Operator structure (MOS 3531) by 239 enlisted Marines based on the T/O requirements review

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Aligns T/Os for MT drivers to T/Es for medium vehicles (FSPG)
- Reduces 3531 operators used as HMMWV drivers (FSPG)
- Provides structure saving for reallocation (FSPG)
- Should combine 3531 and 3533 MOS', so that operators can drive HMMWVs through LVS (Int and Questionnaires)

## Impacts Con

- “In worst case scenario drivers are scarce and critical asset. Reductions are not wise” (Int G-4 MAW)
- “Driving trucks is the most dangerous thing we do- more casualties from truck accidents than any other equipment, so we want to limit incidental drivers to minimum especially with trucks” (Int G-4 FSSG)
- Need more details to make any kind of conclusion (Int)
- Need professional operators even for HMMWVs, check the safety/accident records (Int..)

# Suggestion 42 : Combine all vehicle operator MOSs to one.

Source(s): Interview- MCB CLNC

## Impacts Pro

- All 35XX drivers should be qualified on all tactical wheeled vehicles (i.e.. HMMWV, MTRV, LVS)
- Eases the identification of driver qualifications- all are MOS 3533
- Assists in correcting driver shortages for lower density items

## Impacts Con

- Increases T2P2 time for driver training
- Increases costs for training
- This will only work if the overall number of 3533s is increased Marine Corps-wide (IPR2 Response- I MEF)

# Suggestion 45: Increase Tactical MT assets of the CEB: Migrate 16 MTVR Trucks to CEB from the Hq Btry Artillery Regt. Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Fielding of downsized equipment at the Hq Btry (FSPG)
- Eliminate excess assets and duplicate capabilities at the Hq Btry (FSPG)
- Alleviate mobility deficiency in CEB (FSPG)
- Enhance OMFTS capability of Arty Bn Hq (FSPG)

## Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, Questionnaires)
- Don't separate the trucks from the guns- they are part of the weapon system (Questionnaires, and Int)
- Lack of responsiveness to needs of Arty unit Commander (Int of two Commanders Arty Regt, and Questionnaires)
- Mobility of the Arty Regt Hq Btry suffers (Int CO Arty Regt)
- The "Fix Artillery" Plan with addl Bns and HIMARS may require retention of these assets (Int and Research)

Suggestion 49. Use ILC-like processes to re-engineer Transportation (distribution) to determine the best wartime and peacetime structure for the Marine Corps. Source(s): MATCOM and HQMC ASL

Impacts Pro

- Uses analytic tools, procedures, coordination techniques and trust developed during the maint. & supply ILC efforts
- Reduces structural inefficiencies by allowing the reprogramming of assets to priority requirements
- Prepares Marine Corps transportation (distribution) for transformation to the USMC of 2010-2020
- Establishes a process that analysis the transportation (distribution) migrations suggested by the FSPG within a comprehensive functional framework

Impacts Con

- Must wait until the current ILC initiatives are completed before establishing another effort
- No single transportation organization exists that can analyze the entire USMC transportation function in a comprehensive and coordinated manner (ASL)
- Using the current ILC office for the transportation function would dislocate the maintenance and supply reengineering effort (ASL)
- Garrison motor transport- maybe a possibility of an expanded role (IPR2 Response- MARFORRES)

Suggestion 66 : After completion of the ILC EOM, locate/organize motor transport units with ground maintenance and supply activities

Source(s): Interview- HQMC

Impacts Pro

- Increase equipment readiness
- More efficient due to close physical relationship between operational equipment and supply/maintenance capabilities

Impacts Con

- None Provided

# Suggestion 65: Transfer control of the MWSG to the FSSG

## Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

### Impacts Pro

- The MWSG remains the primary provider of direct support CSS to the Wing
- Maintains the current-level of trust between supported and supporting commands in the MAW
- Allows the FSSG the flexibility to reallocate CSS assets based on the MEF command priorities
- Leads to the reduction of excess and redundant equipment

### Impacts Con

- None Provided



# Suggestion 12: Reduce the number of MWSS' to 2 per MAW and increase the general support capabilities of the MWSG Source(s): I&L HQMC

## Impacts Pro

- Provides realistic support for 2 FOBs as opposed to an unrealistic 4 per MAW
- Gives flexibility by giving the MWSG the capability to augment/reinforce MWSS operations
- Better command and control of MAW CSS assets
- Approximately 40% of current MWSS assets could be reallocated
- Maintains the Capability to support FOBs located remotely from the FSSG

## Impacts Con

- Geographical dispersion of the MAW and MAG operating sites cannot be adequately supported by only 2 MWSSs per MWSG (IPR2 Response- I MEF)
- The MWSG HQ is usually placed with the MAW HQ, an increased, reinforced MWSG will not be able to support dispersed MAG operating sites (IPR2 Response- I MEF)
- The reduction to only 2 MWSSs per MWSG reduces the the immediate expeditionary capability of the MAW to simultaneously support multiple FOB operations to include FARPs (IPR2 Response- I MEF)

Suggestion 13: Tailor MWSS engineer and transportation capabilities to accomplish peacetime and initial wartime missions. Establish Task-organized Marine Wing Support Battalions (MWSB) in the FSSG to augment the MWSS during war Source(s): I&L HQMC

### Impacts Pro

- More responsive to the MAGTF commander's CSS responsibilities
- Effective and efficient use of assets during peace, war, & contingency
- Reduces Excess structure
- Leverages FSSG & MWSS core competencies
- Maintains MWSS relationship with the MAG/ACE

### Impacts Con

- Lack of trust in the FSSG's ability to support
- Fear of cutting too much CSS structure from the MAGTF
- Need to determine the level of support for each peacetime MWSS
- May be less responsive to the MAG/ACE Commander's priorities
- Requires greater planning and communication between the ACE and CSSE

Suggestion 14: Merge MWSS with the CSSD in DS to the MAG in order to ensure unity of command for CSS  
Transfer control of the MWSSG to the FSSG Source(s):  
IPR2 and Questionnaire- I MEF)

Impacts Pro

- Provides only one CSS unit for coordination, planning and execution
- Simplifies C2 challenges
- The MAG commander has only one CSS commander to coordinate with
- This is a permanent solution that completes the FSPG 99 recommendation that only goes half way (retain the MWSS, but provide a CSSD)

Impacts Con

- MWSSs go away
- The MAG does not possess internal AGS resources and capability
- See previous Cons regarding CSSE CSSDs replacing MWSSs

Suggestion 15: Migrate all MWSS FS and MP to the FSSG from the MWSS. Do a vertical “cut” of water supply, hygiene (laundry and shower) , Air Freight. Migrate some refrigeration and MT. Retain rest of MWSS as is Source(s): MWSG OAG Sept 2000

### Impacts Pro

- Identifies some assets that are perhaps excess capabilities
- “Lightens up” the MWSS
- Retains some reduced capabilities

### Impacts Con

- “Plan” may not have been developed in a detailed manner
- Totally removes all FS and MP from the MWSSs

Suggestion 16: Migrate MWSS FS and MP and selected general engineer and internal motor transport capabilities to the FSSG Source(s): MAB Conference Sept 1999

Impacts Pro

- Identifies some assets that are perhaps excess capabilities
- “Lightens up” the MWSS
- Retains some reduced capabilities

Impacts Con

- “Plan” may not have been developed in a detailed manner
- Totally removes all FS and MP from the MWSSs

# Suggestion 17, 18: Migrate selected engineer assets from MWSS to the FSSG or reallocate Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Have too much “excess” general engineer equipment throughout the MAGTF-need a CRSP, equipment rotation or some other alternative (Int, Questionnaires, Research)
- More efficient utilization of common MAGTF assets and capabilities (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires and Research)
- Allows MAGTF elements to concentrate on their specific war fighting capabilities (FSPG)
- Marine Air Board Sept 99 and MWSG OAG Sept 00 have developed alternatives to the FSPG 99 recommendation (Research)

## Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int and Questionnaires)
- Engineering that supports FOB ops and airfield maintenance is an ACE core competency (Int Gen Officers, Commanders, and Staff MAWs, COMCABs)
- Geographical separation of FOBs makes support from external ACE units impossible (Int Gen Officers, Commanders, and Staff MAWs, COMCABs)
- ACE will lose its expeditionary capability (Int.. and Questionnaires)
- Don't count on the Seabees for immediate support (Int GEN officer, USMC (RET))

## Suggestion 39, 40: Migrate selected motor transport assets from MWSS to the FSSG or reallocate Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- More efficient utilization of common MAGTF assets and capabilities (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires)
- Allows MAGTF elements to concentrate on their specific war fighting capabilities (FSPG, Int)
- Marine Air Board Sept 99 and MWSG OAG Sept 00 have developed alternatives to the FSPG 99 recommendation (Research)

### Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int and Questionnaires)
- MWSS MT assets are primarily used to perform core mission of loading ordnance onto aircraft (Int CO MWSG)
- Responsiveness will suffer (Int G-4 FSSG)
- Geographical separation of FOBs makes support from external ACE units impossible (Int G-4 MAW)
- Loss of direct control and responsiveness (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- ACE will lose its expeditionary capability (Int.. and Questionnaires)



Suggestion 76: Overarching ACE CSS Reorganization-  
Beginning in FY02 commence the phased 5 year  
realignment of the ACE Engr., MT, food service, and MP  
functions, equipment and personnel from the MWSS' to  
the CSSE Source(s): FSPG99

Impacts Pro

- More efficient utilization of common MAGTF assets and capabilities (FSPG, Questionnaires, and Int)
- Structure savings and manning decrease (FSPG)
- Allows MAGTF elements to concentrate on their specific war fighting capabilities (FSPG, Questionnaires, and Interviews)
- Firm step in the direction of OMFTS capable force (FSPG)
- "MWSS' always needed augmentation anyway" (Int MGEN)

Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, Questionnaires)
- The loss of direct control and immediate response (Int, and Questionnaires)
- Will be "growing pains" both within the ACE and CSSE as Engr., MT, MP and food service functions are realigned to the CSSE (FSPG)
- Doctrine, and organization documentation will have to be changed (FSPG, and Research)



Suggestion 76: Overarching ACE CSS Reorganization-  
Beginning in FY02 commence the phased 5 year  
realignment of the ACE Engr., MT, food service, and MP  
functions, equipment and personnel from the MWSS' to  
the CSSE cont. Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- There are two FSPG 99 alternative suggestions available specifically in the areas of the AGS organization (MWSG/MWSS) (Research)

### Impacts Con

- Geographical dispersion of FOBs can be immense (Int, Questionnaires and Research)
- CSS C2 exceeds FSSG capabilities (COs FSSG commands)
- Ability for the ACE to move on short notice to support expeditionary operations is dependent upon organic motor transport and engineer equipment (Int and Questionnaires MAW, MAG, and COMCAB)
- MWSS engineer and motor transport provide 8 of the 14 AGS mission essential tasks (Int and Questionnaires MAW, MAG, and COMCAB)

# Suggestion 50: Add 30 Active Component and 15 SMCR enlisted Marines as crewmembers for JSLNBCRS

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Corrects manning shortfalls for JSLNBCRS fielding (FSPG)

## Impacts Con

- Conflicts with JSLNBCRS ORD and TEMP which depicts no increased structure (Research)

# Suggestion 51: Consolidate MEF NBC Decontamination Assets and Responsibility to a single CSSE (i.e. CSSD)

Source(s): MEF Interviews, Questionnaires

## Impacts Pro

- NBC decontamination for a MEF could be an immense NBC task that would become a major CSS mission and would require all the MEF assets working together
- Currently NBC decontamination assets are spread thinly and would be ineffective and inefficient if needed to perform a major NBC decontamination operation- one CSSE with all the resources would remedy this situation
- Training, equipment readiness, skill and MOS development would all improve with this action

## Impacts Con

- Must consider the loss of internal NBC decontamination capabilities of individual units in light of the many other CSS migration suggestions (IPR2 Response- III MEF)
- The potential wide dispersion of the MEF does not lend itself to the effective and responsive use of this consolidated unit (IPR2 Response- I MEF)

# Suggestion 60: Migrate PP&P structure from H&S Co, Supply Bn to BTO Co, Transportation Bn

Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Streamlines shipment process into single owner (FSPG)
- Will improve delivery time & enhance ITV/TAV (FSPG)
- Enhances effective use of emerging technology (FSPG)
- In garrison, placing unit under Base TMO control will provide effective individual skills training (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)

## Impacts Con

- Coordination required with Base TMO for exercise/ deployment support (FSPG)
- PP&P also performs a number of Care and Preservation warehousing missions for Supply Bn (Int G-3 FSSG)
- No real imperative for change (Int G-4 FSSG)
- BTO Companies are going away; move all the PP&P to the Supporting Establishment instead (Questionnaire)
- The shipment process normally goes from supply to PP&P to TMO- why cut supply out? (Int G-3 FSSG)

Suggestion 61: Migrate PP&P structure from H&S Co,  
Supply Bn to Marine Corps Base Source(s): Interviews  
and Questionnaires

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Con

- None Provided

Suggestion 62: PP&P, contract out all Traffic Management functions in the S.E. and restructure and staff TM billets in the LMCC and BTO Co., FSSG to conduct MEF freight ops. Add PP&P capability to the TMO in the BTO Co.

Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Con

- BTO COs are “going away”  
(Interviews and Questionnaires)

Suggestion 71: Migrate PP&P to the S.E. TMO for garrison operations, but maintain a military capability to deploy with TSB during expeditionary operations. PP&P structure could be added to the S.E. T/Os and wartime requirements would be indicated by “X” billets on the Maint. Bn. T/Os Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

### Impacts Pro

- Maintains PP&P Marines for expeditionary operations
- Maintains PP&P in the S.E. for sustainment and for garrison operations
- Maintains a PP&P MOS to execute a set of distinct functions that should not be merged with another MOS

### Impacts Con

- BTO COs are “going away” (Interviews and Questionnaires)

Suggestion 73: The BTO Shipping and Receiving Platoon should be consolidated with PP&P in the Supply Battalion. PP&P is not a core competency of the TSB Source(s):  
IPR2 Response- I MEF

Impacts Pro

- Placement of all PP&P in one unit
- Reduce confusion regarding the unit with the direct responsibility for PP&P
- Appears the BTO Companies are being eliminated anyway

Impacts Con

- None Provided



# Suggestion 55: Migrate Training Allowance Pool from FSSG to CIF contract managed by MATCOM Source(s):

## Interview MCB CLNC

### Impacts Pro

- Supports implementation & execution of CLI (FSPG)
- Supports future warehousing migration initiatives (FSPG)
- Centralizes control of assets, reduces MarFor management oversight (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Provide efficiencies in facility space/utilization (FSPG)
- Could be added to the Central Issue Facility (CIF) contract along with 782 gear, and NBC item management (Int.. MCB staff.)

### Impacts Con

- Requires MSCs to coordinate outside of MEF for support (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- TAP must be deployable for sustained operations support (Int and Questionnaires)
- Resources (i.e. budget base transfer) must follow the migration of tasks from the MARFORs to the Supporting Establishment (Int., and Questionnaires)
- Will base and stations have enough funds to maintain the same level of support (Int CG MAW)

# Suggestion 56: Migrate Training Allowance Pool from FSSG to Marine Corps Bases Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Pro

- Supports implementation & execution of CLI (FSPG)
- Supports future warehousing migration initiatives (FSPG)
- Centralizes control of assets, reduces MarFor management oversight (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Provide efficiencies in facility space/utilization (FSPG)
- Could be added to the Central Issue Facility (CIF) contract along with 782 gear, and NBC item management (Int.. MCB staff.)

## Impacts Con

- Requires MSCs to coordinate outside of MEF for support (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- TAP must be deployable for sustained operations support (Int and Questionnaires)
- “There are few changes that can be made within the USMC in terms of people, equip., organizations and mission that do not impact on facilities” (Research)
- Resources (i.e. budget base transfer) must follow the migration of tasks from the MARFORs to the Supporting Establishment (Int.., and Questionnaires)
- Will base and stations have enough funds to maintain the same level of support (Int CG MAW)

# Suggestion 46: Migrate Truck Co, MARDIV to the FSSG

## Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Focus MAGTF elements on core competencies (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Provides GS capability to weight main effort (FSPG, Int and Questionnaires)
- Enhance OMFTS capability (FSPG)

### Impacts Con

- Commands and units will lose responsiveness if they lose currently held logistics assets (Int, and Questionnaires)
- The core competencies of the MarDiv is to shoot, move and communicate. Truck Co is CS not CSS (Int BGEN MarDiv, GCE Officers, HQMC officers)
- Span of control is too great for the Transportation Support Bn (Int CO TSB FSSG)
- Truck Companies removed just before SWA, but quickly restored when confronted with realities of war (Int, Questionnaires and Research)

# Suggestion 46: Migrate Truck Co, MARDIV to the FSSG continued Source(s): FSPG99

## Impacts Con

- The Transportation Support Bn primary mission is to transport cargo not personnel- consider the impact on the TSB if this additional and significant tactical troop transport mission is assigned (IPR2 Response- I MEF)
- The TSBs are already at 1,100 plus Marines and additional growth will overburden the C2 capacity of the current command staff (Interview- OpsO TSB and ALOC Student)

## Impacts Con

- Before change, improve and test the processes and provide adequate C2 to handle all the required coordination (Int and Questionnaire G-4 Ops MarDiv)
- Increases competition for scarce resources with adjudication of priorities moved to the MEF CG and G-4 (Int and Questionnaires MEF, MarDiv, MAW)
- Increases need for cross MAGTF element planning (Int and Questionnaires)
- Reduces maneuver capabilities of the MarDiv (Int and Questionnaires CG MarDiv, commanders and staff)

## Suggestion 27: Excess Engineer Equipment: Conduct in-depth T/E review of all units (active & reserve) holding engineer & utility equipment Source(s): FSPG99

### Impacts Pro

- Reduce large quantities of “excess” equipment (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires and Research)
- Reduce storage/shipping & maintenance requirements; improves personnel to equip ratio (FSPG, Int, Questionnaires and Research)
- “We run out of people before we run out of equipment” (Int G-3 Ops FSSG)
- “We have 7 MEFs worth of gear out there” (Int, Questionnaires)
- There are 9,000 plus more PEIs fielded since SWA, but the manning has decreased significantly (Research)

### Impacts Pro cont.

- T/Es exceed T/Os capability to operate and maintain (Research)
- Use a training allowance, CRSP, admin. Storage program (Int and Questionnaires)
- Accept the current T/E numbers as being excessive and reduce to match T/O without T/E study (IPR2 Response HQMC- POE)

### Impacts Con

- Why do a review if no action will take place (Int)

# Suggestion 29: Use ILC-like processes tailored to the Engineer function to improve Marine Corps engineering

## Source(s): ASL HQMC & MATCOM

### Impacts Pro

- Uses previous ILC tools, procedures and coord. Techniques
- Inserts engineer leadership and engineer-oriented software into an ILC-like process
- Uses missions/task lists from deliberate planning as a requirement's baseline
- Focuses CEB, Wing, CSS, NCF, and MCES engineers into reengineering a set of comprehensive and coordinated Marine Corps capabilities
- Inserts Seabee core competency as project planners into the process

### Impacts Pro cont.

- Prepares the near-term USMC engineering functions for transformation to the USMC engineering function of 2010-2020
- Establishes a process that analysis the engineer migrations suggested by the FSPG within a comprehensive functional framework

Suggestion 29 Use ILC-like processes tailored to the Engineer function to improve Marine Corps engineering continued Source(s): ASL HQMC

Impacts Con

- No single engineer organization exists that can analyze the entire USMC engineering function in a comprehensive and coordinated manner
- Using the current ILC office for the engineer function would dislocate the maintenance and supply reengineering effort

Suggestion 64: USMC should conduct a realignment of the engineer function based on an in-depth study of all engineer requirements (from light sets to dozers). The Seabees should be included functional analysis Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Pro cont.

- None Provided



Suggestion 67: After completion of the ILC EOM, locate/organize engineer units with ground maint.. And supply activities Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

Impacts Pro

- Increase equipment readiness
- More efficient due to close physical relationship between operational equipment and supply/maintenance capabilities

Impacts Pro cont.

- None Provided

# Suggestion 28: Form a Marine Engineer Group (MEG) at the FSSG and add a DC/S Engineering Officer to the MarFor and MEF Staffs Source(s): Interviews,

## Questionnaires and Research

### Impacts Pro

- The MAGTF commander can weight the engineer effort
- Increased equipment readiness, improved training and skill development, career mentoring
- Equipment excesses and redundancies will be eliminated
- The ACE and GCE will be provided tailored, better trained, mission focused and prepared units to support their tasks
- A Col as the DC/S Engineering will be the single voice and planner for the MarFor and MEF commander
- The DC/S Engineering will provide better coordination of the engr. effort

### Impacts Con

- The span of control may be too great for one commander and staff.
- Additional C2 assets will be needed in order to properly implement the MEG
- ACE and GCE commanders will no longer maintain day-to-day direct ownership of engineering equipment
- A MEG with Army and NCF units may be too challenging for a Marine 9904/1302 Colonel to effectively employ (IPR2 Response- I MEF)
- The MEF CG already has an engineering cell in the G-4 for advice (IPR2 Response- I MEF)

# Suggestion 35 Eliminate MOS 0411 Maintenance Management Specialist Source(s): I&L HQMC

## Impacts Pro

- Eliminates 551 structure spaces
- Re-designates 313 Billets in the GCE as Logistics Clerks
- Matches the actual need for Logistics Clerks with an accurate MOS designation.
- May help the Marine Corps transform to a paperless environment IAW the Government Business Reform Act
- Need to replace inefficient maintenance management and supply procedures and systems based on 1970 technology
- May result from process change resulting from the Echelon of Maintenance and Consolidated Supply Function (ILC)

## Impacts Con

- May be some maintenance management functions that still require a few specialists

Suggestion 57 Conduct a functional analysis of the contracting processes across the MarFor, Supporting Establishment, and Reserves to determine the best structural alignment for supporting expeditionary operations Source(s): I&L HQMC

Impacts Pro

- Improve deliberate and crises action planning for host nation support, ACSA, and contingency contracting,
- Reduce the MAGTF's logistics footprint too include engineers and motor transport
- Ensure that adequately trained contract officers employ in support of MAGTF operations
- Improve coordination between the MARFOR and joint and/or multinational force contract operations.

Impacts Con

- None Provided

# Suggestion 58: Combine and converge Aviation and Ground Logistics Systems Source(s): Aviation Implementation Plan Nov 2000

## Impacts Pro

- Both ground and aviation logistics processes are concentrating on the use of “best business practices”
- There is an opportunity to converge these two efforts in order to provide a “seamless” logistics system

## Impacts Con

- The ground and aviation logistics improvements are currently two separate initiatives

Suggestion 69 Reorganize Supply Bn by transfer of Ammo Co to H&S Bn and Medical Log Co to a combined Med/Dental Bn Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

Impacts Pro

- Allows the Supply Battalion to concentrate on supply chain management which is its core competency

Impacts Con

- None Provided

Suggestion 70: Consolidate, transfer, contract-out the management of all MEF C TAM items to the S.E.

Source(s): Interview HQMC I&L

Impacts Pro

- Efficiency due to the central management of assets
- Capable of building deployable blocks
- Issue items on an as needed or required
- Organic supply officers directly order, receipt for and immediately issue items on unit CMRs to responsible officers
- Eliminates C TAM storage by battalion organic supply sections

Impacts Con

- None Provided

Suggestion 4: Identify and quantify the CSS requirements and capabilities of the MAGTF in current OPLANs and COE as part of establishing a baseline of current reqrmts. & capabilities. Consider the specific time-phased reqrmts. at the “point of application” Source(s): Interviews

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Con

- None Provided



Suggestion 6: Determine and quantify what capabilities within the FSSG are required for internal support, and what is available to support the rest of the MAGTF. Determine and measure the responsiveness for requests for CSS support Source(s): Interview- CG MARDIV

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Con

- None Provided

Suggestion 74: Test, evaluate and exercise logistics capabilities during exercises using different tools/models and simulations other than what we currently possess. We need a more challenging, comprehensive and realistic logistics “play” in exercises. Source(s): IPR2 Response-MARFORRES

### Impacts Pro

- May detect strengths and weaknesses of the logistics process and capabilities during exercises
- Provide improved training and educational experience to all exercise participants
- Help model various logistics concepts and organizations
- Such models are probably already available

### Impacts Con

- Will cost resources to develop if such improved exercise models are not readily available
- May take time to locate and implement the use of such capabilities

Suggestion 52: Determine the logistical requirements and capabilities of the MEF in supporting NBC decontamination operations Source(s): Interviews, Questionnaires- III MEF

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Con

- None Provided

Suggestion 7: Review and revalidate all T/O mission statements to specify the required mission essential logistics capabilities Source(s): Interview and Questionnaires

Impacts Pro

- None Provided

Impacts Con

- None Provided

# Suggestion 3: Conduct a Task/Functional Analysis of units throughout the MAGTF to identify both garrison and war time operational requirements (Essential additional duties not identified by T/O) Source(s): Interviews and Questionnaires - Marine Corps-wide

## Impacts Pro

- A bottoms up analysis of the garrison and operational task requirements provides basic information in order to recommend organizational changes
- A task or functional analysis provides an updated description of what the MAGTF is supposed to be prepared for
- Allows changes to be made by “shifting from a known point”
- Much data already exists- no need to start from ground zero

## Impacts Con

- A task or functional analysis takes resources